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I
MORE THAN forty years ago, Professor Machen attempted a
comprehensive examination of the corporate theory in view of the
complete obliviousness of American corporate theory scholars to the
wealth of controversial learning enthusiastically accumulated by Con-
tinental jurists. Nevertheless, the conclusion he reached at that time,
after a troublesome excursion, was in essence a reaffirmation of the ortho-
dox American doctrine.1  He said:2
A corporation, or indeed any group or succession of men-such as the Church,
or any army, or a political party-is a real entity-something other than the
mere sum of the members for the time being; but this entity is actually
impersonal, and is regarded as a person only by way of metaphor or by a
fiction of law.
In addition, he warned:3
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' The orthodox American lawyer would be apt to say that a corporation is a ficti-
tious, artificial person, composed of natural persons, created by the state, existing only
in contemplation of law, insensible, soulless, immortal. Machen, Corporate Personality,
24. HARV. L. REv. z53, z57 (igii). Chief Justice John Marshall spoke in a similar
way, and at the same time decided that incorporation springs from a contract between
the state and the incorporator, in the famous case of Dartmouth College v. Woodward,
17 U.s. (4 Wheat.) 5S8 (18i9).
' Machen, supra note 1, at 347.
Id. at 365. Machen's viewpoint of the fictitious personality is as follows: "As a
corporate entity is not a rational being, is not capable of understanding the law's
commands, and has no will which can be affected by threats of legal punishment, it
follows ...that a corporation is not a real person, if the word Cperson' be used in its
ordinary sense." Id. at 265. So, "the corporate entity, or personifications which we
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As scholars, or as students of the history of jurisprudence, we may pursue
with interest the erudite and brilliant essays of French, German, and Italian
jurists, but as practical lawyers we may and should disregard all that wealth
of learning, contemplating it only as something to be avoided, and as teaching
the dangerous character of the similar artificial statements which we find in
our own law books. To understand and apply correctly the doctrine of
corporate personality, no other guide is desirable than sturdy common sense.
He, therefore, avoided dispute with Professor Geldart, who advocated
at that time the real personality theory,4 because, in Machen's words, it
signified "the outbreak in the common-law world of a metaphysical
contest similar to that which has absorbed so much attention upon the
Continent of Europe."5
After Machen, such brilliant scholars as Professors John Dewey and
Bryant Smith penetrated critically into the crucial points of the corporate
theory. But they did not assay any legal construction other than the
traditional one. Rather, such a problem seemed to them to be a matter
of no importance or interest.6
call a corporation is regarded as having rights and liabilities for the sake of convenience;
but it is men of flesh and blood . . . who must . . . enjoy the rights and bear the
burdens attributed by the law to the corporate entity." Id. at z66. In this sense, his
basic standpoint is implied to be nominalism-singularism in philosophical terms which
do not admit the real existence of "conception" or "the universal" (realism or uni-
versalism).
'Geldart, Legal Personality, 27 L.Q. REV. 90 (igi i). Geldart's objections to the
fictitious theory are, of course, primarily founded on the social reality of the corporation
and in details are directed to the fictitiousness of the conception of co-ownership of
corporations by the stockholders while they have only a right to dividends without any
power of use or disposal of corporate properties. Id. at 97. He also objects to the
conception of contracts between society and its members, since contracts between indi-
viduals do not, as a rule, long outlive those who make them. Id. at xoS. His basic
motive seems to lie in the promotion of the liberty of trade unions as autonomous and
real social units. Laski's pluralistic state theory is analogous, and will be referred to
later in connection with the organic theory.
' Machen, supra note i, at 365 n.z9.
'Dewey attempts an historical analysis of corporate theories in The Historic Back-
ground of Corporate Legal Personality, 35 YALE L.J. 655 (1926). According to
Dewey, controversies over corporate theories are "primarily political and economic in
nature, but there is not one of them which has not left its profound impress upon the
law, including particularly the doctrines of the nature and seat of judicial personality.
Discussions and concepts may have been in form intellectual, using the full arsenal of
dialectical weapons; they have been in fact, where they have any importance, 'rationali-
zations' of the positions and claims of some party to a struggle. It is this fact which
gives such extraordinary interest to the history of doctrines of judicial personality."
Id. at 664-65.
Smith emphasizes the functional aspect of legal personality in Legal Persoutality, 37
YALE LJ. 283 (1928). He quotes Gray as saying, "Whether the corporation is a
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It would be helpful in this connection further to examine the con-
troversy between Professor Berle and the late Professor Dodd con-
cerning "for whom are corporate managers trustees?"7  There has been
increasing recognition of corporations as social institutions or organisms,
rather than mere aggregates of stockholders. Berle acknowledges this
in his recently published book, The Twentieth Century Capitalist Revo-
lution. But Berle was undoubtedly correct twenty-eight years ago when
he expounded the thesis that'
all powers granted to a corporation or to the management of a corporation,
or to any group within the corporation, whether derived from statute or
charter or both, are necessarily and at all times exercisable only for the
ratable benefit of all the shareholders as their interest appears.
Faced with the real situation of the 1936's, that while general share-
holders were being transformed into mere investors not capable of par-
ticipation in management, and management, as corporate administrators,
was being granted virtually absolute power, emphasis on the trusteeship
of directors was unavoidable. It may be said that corporation law had-
reached substantially the stage which equity had reached when it faced
the situation of a trustee who had been granted apparently absolute
powers in his deed of trust.9 For the protection of general shareholders
who became mere investors against self-seeking management, therefore,
it was absolutely necessary to accent the position of shareholders as co-
owners of the corporation.
But Dodd was equally correct when he said, in criticizing Berle's
thesis, that corporations as legal entities are social units independent of
the comprising shareholders. In other words, corporations are juristic
fictitious entity, or whether it is a real entity, with no real will, or whether, according
to Gierke's theory, it is a real entity with a real will, seems to be a matter of no practi-
cal importance or interest." Id. at 292-93 n.38. He is interested in the corporation
as a functional aspect of an organized group on which legal rights and duties are predi-
cated. Id. at 293. Whether a corporation or a partnership or other unincorporated
association is to be treated as a legal person in any particular respect is improperly
decided unless decided on its own merit. He seems especially to direct attention to the
fact that courts, on the one hand, came to treat an unincorporated association or society
as an entity and, on the other hand, to disregard the legal personality of the corporation
when faced with abuse of the legal entity device. Id. at 299.
'Berle, Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust, 44 HARV. L. REV. 2049 (1932);
BERLE, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 240-76 (294o) ; Dodd,
For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 HARV. L. REV. I x45 (932) ; Berle,
For Whom Corporate Managers Are Trustees, id. at 1365; BERLE, THE TWENTIETH
CENTURY CAPITALIST REVOLUTION (1956).
'Berle, Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust, 44. HARV. L. REV. 1049 (1931).
*1d. at 1073.
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persons, and as such, have duties to, as well as privileges from, society.
Dodd was not utopian in believing that "public opinion, which ultimately
makes law, has made and is today making substantial strides in the
direction of a view of the business corporation as an economic institution
which has a social service as well as a profit-making function."1
The rationality of Dodd's belief is strongly evidenced by the fact
that twenty-nine states have already passed statutes authorizing corpora-
tions to make contributions to philanthropy and education." "Those
[the directors] through whom it [the corporation] acts may therefore
employ its funds in a manner appropriate to a person practising a
profession and imbued with a sense of social responsibility without
thereby being guilty of a breach of trust."'1 2  In other words, not only
the protection of general shareholders as investors against self-seeking
management, but also the relations or responsibilities of corporations
as social-economic units to employees and consumers and ultimately to
the community must be emphasized.
If this is so, then, sociologically at least, a corporation may be
thought of as more than a mere fictitious person who is nothing but an
aggregate of stockholders, with directors and officers chosen by them
as their trustees or agents. Far from being "soulless," a corporation has
a "collective soul," even though the soul be that of an automatic self-
perpetuating oligarchy of directors. It was recently so described by
Berle, 3 who, however, makes no reference to legal construction while
drawing attention to the political and sociological significance of the
recent corporation trend.
Such stable features of the corporate theory in the United States can
be strikingly contrasted with the colorful, and at the same time specu-
10Dodd, supra note 7, at i148.
"BERLE, THE TWENTIETH CENTURY CAPITALIST REVOLUTION 167 (1956).
2 Dodd, supra note 7, at 116i.
13BERLE, THE TWENTIETH CENTURY CAPITALIST REVOLUTION 183 (1956). We
find the same idea in Kaysen, The Social Significance of the Modern Corporation, 47
AM. ECON. REV. 311 (1957). Kaysen especially seems to point out that the conception
of business corporations as social institutions must be founded on the establishment of
a management bureaucracy. Berle points out more dearly the significance of the proxy
device, which is ordinarily in the possession of directors. He has said in his most re-
cently published book, ECONOMIC POWER AND THE FREE SOCIETY 10 (1957), "The
control system in today's corporations, when it does not lie solely in the directors as in
the American Telephone and Telegraph Company, lies in a combination of the directors
of a so-called control bloc (a misnomer, incidentally) plus the directors themselves.
For practical purposes, therefore, the control or power element in most large corpora-
tions rests in its group of directors and it is autonomous-or autonomous if taken to-
gether with a control bloc."
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lative, features in Japan. Since, as part of our historical destiny, we in
Japan have had to transplant corporation law as one part of the unprece-
dented reception of Western law during the Meiju period,' 4 and because
of our inherent inclination toward theoretical speculation, we have been
forced to struggle with all sorts of corporate theories. In fact, theories
have always been somewhat ahead of social reality. Japan has been
destined as a melting pot for all corporate theories as well as all Euro-
pean and American civilization.
This article primarily purports to portray the development of the
corporate theory in Japan in its relation to its political and social struc-
ture. Considerable attention must first be given, however, to a critical
survey of the development of Western corporate theory with reference
to its political and social structure. Such a survey supplies indispensable
criteria for evaluation of the development of the corporate theory in
Japan.
II
When we reflect on the history of the corporate or association theory,
we find an alternation between an atomistic tendency and an organic
tendency. Generally speaking, the former corresponds to the theory of
the corporation as a fiction, and the latter to the theory of the cor-
poration as a real person. The social contract theory leans toward the
former.15
" With regard to the inception of the Japanese corporation law and its recent revi-
sion after World War II, see Blakemore & Yazawa, Japanese Commercial Code Revisions
Concerning Corporations, z AM. J. COMP. L. 12 (1953).
"' In this connection, see GIERKF, JOHANNES ALTHUSIUs UND DIE ENTWICKLUNG
DER NATURRECHTLICHEN STAATSTHEORIEN [JOHANNES ALTHUsIus AND THE DEVELOP-
MENT OF NATURAL LAW THEORY OF THE STATE] (1So). (It is believed that an
English translation of this book is now being undertaken by an American writer, Bernard
Frey. This monograph is the backbone of Book IV of his German Law of Associations.)
This book is a history of the social contract theory of the natural law under compre-
hensive implications-e.g., under (i) Staatsvertag [social contract of state], (z) Volks-
souveranitat [sovereignty of people], (3) das Representaiprincip [principle of repre-
sentation], (4) Federalismus [federalism], and (5) Rechtsstaat [constitutional govern-
ment]. According to Gierke, the social contract theory of modern times is divided into
two tendencies--atomistic-centralistic and collectivistic-individualistic. The former grew
in France, where centralization, only "powerful central government and free indi-
viduals," was pushed to the forefront; the latter grew in Germany, where decentrali-
zation-that is, a pluralistic social structure which permits the autonomy of various
subordinate bodies-was pushed to the forefront. Id. at 256-82. But Gierke rejected
both as atomistic-mechanical and pursued his historic-organic theory as genuine theory.
Id. at 317-20. In any case, his description of the history of the social contract theory of
natural law is most excellent and unique. Incidentally, a recently-published book,
GOUGH, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT (1957), presents a critical study of the development
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"Unity" in "plurality" is sociologically common to associations of
all kinds through each stage of history. In this sense, a corporation is
an entity-not imaginary or fictitious, not artificial, but natural. Its
existence is as real as that of an army or the Church.", But as far as
the legal construction is concerned, each specific political and social-
economic situation at one time pushes the "plurality" concept and at
another time the "unity" concept to the fore. To state it fully, the
choice between the atomistic-fictitious and the organic-real theories de-
pends not so much upon one's philosophical preference for nominalism-
singularism or realism-universalism, as upon the specific political, social,
and economic situation.
A single example may be selected:
The postulate of democracy or civil society in Western Europe 8 is
that the state is under the co-ownership of sovereign citizens. In this
connection, political theory, for which lawyers have provided most ideas,
borrowed the concept of partnership rather than the apparently far more
appropriate concept of incorporation. As Dr. Maitland noted, such an
application of the concept of partnership, the application of primarily
private law to the state, was the wisdom of political philosophers.' He
then goes on to say,20
of the social contract theory, and devotes much discussion to the American Constitution.
For the most part, however, it relies upon Gierke's Aithusius. The social contract theory
is in itself, of course, not incompatible with the organic theory in terms of political sci-
ence and sociology, as shown by the theory of Suarez. As time has gone by, however,
the atomistic-individualistic tendency has been pushed to the forefront. Therefore, the
atomistic-organic dichotomy used here would seem to be somewhat oversimplified and
inaccurate.
'6 Machen, supra note i, at z6z.
"N]one of these conceptions is absolutely true or false per se; none of them can
convince the others of its own adequacy and of the inadequacy of the opponent. But
each of them may rise in the period of the domination of its respective type of culture
and decline when the uncongenial type of culture rises. Each of them has a 'popu-
larity' and is believed to be true and 'scientific' in the period of domination of its con-
genial type of culture mentality and becomes 'false' when this culture mentality declines."
2 SOROKIN, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL DYNAMICS 312 (1937).
8 Though the ambiguity of "Western Europe" must be admitted, see Troeltsch, a
German philosopher who spoke of "the contrast between German thought and the thought
of Western Europe." Troeltsch, The Ideals of Natural Law and Humanity in World
Politics, in BARKER, NATURAL LAW AND THE THEORY OF SOCIETY app. I (195o).
" GIERKE, POLITICAL THEORIES OF THE MIDDLE AGE xxiii (Maitland transl. 195 x)
[hereinafter cited as Maitland]. According to Maitland, the current doctrine of cor-
porations, the classical and Innocentia Doctrine, stood beneath the level of philosophic
thought. A merely fictitious personality created by the state and shut up within the
[Vol. x96o: 535
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philosophy reacted upon legal theory. When the State itself had become a
merely collective unit-a sum of presently existing individuals bound together
by the operation of their own wills-it was not likely that any other group
would seem capable of withstanding similar analysis.
Therefore, all kinds of associations were necessarily thought of as part-
nerships of composing members. Business corporations are partnerships
of stockholders, and stockholders are co-owners of such corporations.2 '
The Roman lawyers' traditional distinction between universitas (cor-
poration) and societas (partnership) was removed: 22
The universitas was lowered to the rank of societas, or the societas was raised
to the rank of the universitas. Both alike exhibited a certain unity in plu-
rality; but in the one case as in the other, this personality was to be thought
of as a mere labor-saving device, like stenography, or the mathematician's
symbols. What we may call the Bracket Theory or Expansible Symbol
Theory of the Corporation really stands in sharp contrast with the Fiction
limit of private law was not what the philosopher wanted when he went about to
constitute the state itself. Incidentally, Innocent IV, who became Pope in 1243, was
one of the top-ranking scholars of Roman canon law and an exponent of the revival of
the fictitious personality of the corporation. 3 GIERKE, DAS DEUTSCHE GENossEN-
SCHAFTSRECHT [GERMAN LAW OF ASSOCIATIONS] 279, 363 (1881). His theory con-
tributed to centralization in terms of church policy, thus depriving the local churches
of their autonomy. Cf. Maitland xix. In this connection, it must be noted that "the
fiction theory is ultimately a philosophical theory that the corporate body is but a name,
a thing of intellect5 the concession theory may be indifferent as to the question of the
reality of a corporate body; what it must insist upon is that legal power is derived
[from the state]." Dewey, supra note 6, at 667. But both tend ultimately in the same
direction. The Innocentia Doctrine was primarily stated as the reason why an ecclesi-
astic collegiuvr and aniversita$ or capifulunm could not be excommunicated or be guilty
of a delict, because they have neither a body nor a will. A chapter was but a name and
an incorporated res. 3 GIERKE DAS DEUTSCHE GENOSSENSCHAPTRECHT [GERMAN
LAw OF ASSOCIATIONS] 299-85 (188) ; Dewey, supra note 6, at 665.
20 Maitland xxiv.
21 One of the reasons why corporations were easily constructed as partnerships was
that in England, France, and other West European countries where modernization and
industrialization grew gradually and naturally, dominant business units grew step by
step from single firms to partnerships, and from partnerships with limited liabilities to
corporations.
"Maitland xxiv. The same explanation can be found in BARKER, op. cit. supra
note xg, at xvi. Universitas is a corporation by Roman definition and was interpreted,
especially by Innocent IV, as a fictitious personality. As such, it was conveyed to
modem times and was thought of as the original type of corporation by Savigny and
his scholars. Societas is a partnership in Roman law and shows strong inclination to
individualism. It is more easily dissolved than the partnership (Gemeinschaft zur
gesanmmten: Hand) of Anglo-Germanic law, which shows "unity" in "plurality," like
other associations. MECHEM, ELEMENTS OF PARTNERSHIP xxii-xxiii (1920).
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Theory as Savigny conceived it,2" though sometimes English writers seem to
be speaking of the one and thinking of the other. The existing corporators,
who in the scheme are mere guardians for something that the State has insti-
tuted, become in the other scheme the real "subjects" of those rights and
duties that are ascribed to the corporation, though legal art usually keeps these
"subjects" enclosed within a bracket.
The organic theory may be a historical heritage of German law, as
emphasized by Dr. Gierke2 4 Nevertheless, the theory was a response
to the specific situation of nineteenth century German modernization.
Prussian constitutional monarchy was a compromise between the mon-
arch and the people. It was thus necessary to leave in some doubt on
which side sovereignty resided.2r The answer was that sovereignty
"' "The Savignian corporation is no 'subject' for liberties and franchises or right of
self-government. Really and 'publicistically' it can hardly be other than a wheel in the
State's machinery, though for the purpose of Property Law a personification of this
wheel is found to be convenient. Lastly, some popular thoughts about 'body' and cmem-
ber' must needs go overboard. The guardian is no 'member' of his ward, and how,
even by way of fiction, could a figment be composed of real men? We had better leave
body and members to the vulgar." Maitland xxi. The fatal weakness of this theory is
that a corporation is thought of as something like a minor who stands under the guardian-
ship of directors and stockholders, ultimately of the state, and, therefore, is exempted
from tort liability. Faced with the situation that in proportion to the growth of rail-
roads, cases of tort liability of railway corporations increased, this theory showed its
incapacity, cf. Maitland xxxix, and was gradually replaced by the organic theory of
corporation. According to the latter theory, all powers and all liabilities can be attributed
to the corporation, through acts of its organs or agents, as a living organism like a
natural person, except in the field of family law. In Anglo-American law, however,
where the principle of liability of principal (through the theory of agency) was estab-
lished, we need not worry about the liability of legal persons. In any event, the
Savignian theory is a typical model of the fusion of the fictitious theory and the con-
cession theory.
2" GIERKE, DAs DEUTSCHE GENOSSENSCHAFTSRECHT [GERMAN LAW OF AssocIA-
TIONS] (1868, 1873, 1881, 1913). There is inadequate space to enter into the details
of Gierke's theory, which is a comprehensive historical analysis covering all human
groups, including states, at each historical stage. Such an attempt may be a German
mode of systematization. But its success seems to have been founded upon the moderni-
zation of the German society, with its tendency toward homogeneity. Gierke's associa-
tion theory is thought of as a basic principle of the democratization of a specific German
type. Therefore, the criticism of him by West European natural law theorists should
be noted. MAITLAND, POITCAL THEORY OF MIDDLE AGE (rev. ed. 195i), which is
a translation of III GIERKE, DAs DEUTSCHE GENOSSENSCHAFTSRECHT [GERMAN LAW
OF ASSOCIATIONS] ch. z (is8 ), especially the translator's introduction; BARKER, Op.
cit. supra note 18, app. 2, which is a translation of Gierke's conception of Law. Much
of the writer's criticism of Gierke and his understanding of the theoretical relationship
between the social contract theory of natural law and the historic-organic theory which
is developed in this article is owed to these two English writers.
" "For him [Gierke] Sovereignty is an attribute, not of some part of the State, but
of the Gesammtperson, the whole organized community ..... " Maitland xiii.
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resided in the state itself as the real person which is the organism. The
"unity" theory was, thus, pushed to the fore. And this theory of the
state must be carried through in the case of associations of all other kinds.
The owner of the business corporation is rather the corporation itself,
as the real person which is the organism, rather than the mere aggregate
of stockholders. In fact, such a construction appears to be more adequate
to business corporations, where the fictitiousness of the co-ownership by
shareholders comes easily to mind.
The development of an organic theory of the corporation may also
be considered a response to the organic theory of the state. Characteris-
tically, an absolutist state is conceived of as an entity unto itself, separate
from and above its subjects. Historically, the subjects of such states
can better preserve their interests if they group themselves (or are
already grouped) into associations-whether modern corporations or
medieval communes-which are themselves regarded as organic entities
of the same species as the state itself 6 -or, as Hobbes put it, "qesser
commonwealths in the bowels of a greater, like worms in the entrails
of a natural man.""-  In any event, neither the state nor the corporation
has any room to admit the concept of contract, even that of social con-
tract. In other words, the distinction between Korperschaft (corpora-
tion) and Gesellschaft (partnership) is strictly maintained.
The above description, for the convenience of comparison, shows
only the typical pattern. It is no wonder, therefore, that not a few
German scholars, such as Dr. Jhering,28 followed the natural juris-
prudence, paralleling the so-called bracket theory or expansible sym-
bolic theory of the corporation, and calling the development "the new
fictitious theory" (Neuere Fiktionstheorie). Meanwhile, Harold Laski
adopted the real personality theory as the foundation of his pluralistic
"6 In any event, in countries where modernization or industrialization was delayed
in starting and afterwards rapidly caught up with the level of the forerunners, on the
one hand, big financial industrial corporations grew within a short time5 on the other
hand, feudalistic remnants remained in the political and social fields. Either the organic
theory or ultimately romaticism most adequately matches such a reality. Such was the
situation in Japan.
2 7 HOBBES, LEVIATHAN ch. ii (1651).
26 Jhering teaches that the legal personality is not the creature of the state, but an
abbreviated way of writing the names of the several composing members, especially for
the convenience of action or claim against the outer world. So, the true subjects of
rights are composing natural persons, and not the legal entity. III JHERING, GEIST DES
RoMISCHEN RECHT 356 (1877)- See Machen, supra note i, at z57; I WOLFF, ORGAN-
SCRAFT UND JURISTISCHE PFRSON 37 (1933)- Such a tendency gradually achieved
importance even in German jurisprudence, especially in the field of private law. I
WOLFF, op. cit. sutpra, at 63.
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state theory, 9 and Dr. Michoud's theory, 0 according to which the sub-
stratum of a corporation is not organism, but organization, is a French
variety of the organic theory, which has exerted considerable influence
upon the French corporation theory.
The problem, however, concerns the differences in practical conse-
quences of the atomistic theory and the organic theory. The following
are a few examples which come to mind:
i. Under the German law, which has been more or less influenced
by the organic theory, corporations are generally thought to have general
powers3' like natural persons, except those which relate to physiological
aspects, those of family law, and other statutory limitations. The pur-
poses of business corporations which are listed in the articles of incorpora-
tion, therefore, must have been thought of not as the scope or limitations
of corporate capacities or powers, but rather as authority of limitations
imposed by articles upon directors as corporate "organs." Moreover,
the doctrine of constructive notice of the articles of incorporation was
not required to develop. There has also been no objection to its having
discretionary power of philanthropic donation, because the donation of
a part of profit for such purposes has been thought to infringe no divi-
dend right of stockholders. 32
By way of contrast, under Anglo-American law, the so-called ultra
vires theory has, in the past at least, had considerable importance. Such
a conclusion has not necessarily been drawn from the atomistic-partner-
ship theory of corporations, however, but rather has owed its origin to
' Laski, The Personality of AssociationS, 29 HARV. L. REV. 404. (19x6) (this article
is a backbone of his FOUNDATION OF SOVEREIGNTY (192I)). According to Laski, if
the personality of associations is real and not conferred by the state, "we then give to
this latter group no peculiar merit. We repose it the title of creator of all else. We
make it justify itself by its consequences. We stimulate its activities by making it com-
pete with the work of other groups co-extensive with or complementary to itself." Id.
at 426.
" MICHOUD, LA NOTION DE LA PERSONALITE MORAL, REVUE DE DROIT PUBLIC ET
DE LA SCIENCE POLITIQUE (1899). This theory found many followers in Japan, but it
seems little more than tautology. On the other hand, Gierke's organic theory does not
confuse a sociological organism with a biological organism. This is clear even from
the terminology of association law. Human groups or associations are in their very
nature nothing but legal organizations. Without organization norm, there are no human
groups.
" As far as German classical literature is concerned, mention will be made only of
GIERKE, GENOSSENSCHAFTS-THEORIE UND DIE DEUTSCHE RECHTSSPRECHUNc 141, 603;
x LEHMANN, DAS RECHT DER AKTIENGESELLSCHAFTEN i9 (1898). Cf. I MICHOUD,
LE THEORIE DE LA PERSONALIT MORAL ch. 7 (i9o6).
82 E.g., 2 LEHMANN, op. cit. supra note 31, at 421.
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the remnants of the Savignian fiction theory or the concession theory,
according to which the powers of corporations were given by the act of
incorporation itselff3  It is no wonder, therefore, that today in the
United States, the words "authority or limitations imposed by the articles
on those who act for the corporation" are replacing the traditional
phrase, "corporate powers or capacities." The tendency of the statutory
revision may be said to be in the direction of the abolition of the doctrine
of constructive notice of the articles of incorporation and the substitution
of the doctrine of general capacity for the doctrine of limited capacity. 3
Such a substitution obliterates all difficulty about the donation of a part
of profit to philanthropic and other social welfare purposes, so long as
this may be argued to benefit the corporation by promoting patronage or
improving employee relations.35
2. According to most German scholars, who have been more or less
under the influence of the organic theory, there exist two kinds of rights
of shareholders against corporations. The first kind are rights which
must be exercised jointly with other shareholders for the common pur-
poses of the corporation and which, therefore, are subject to the common
interests of the corporation. Such rights cannot be waived; but on the
other hand, they are subject to the restriction by corporate power-
i.e., by charter or by corporate action. This is why such rights are
called rights of common interest in the corporation (e.g., voting
rights). The second kind are rights which serve the individual interest
of a particular shareholder and which, therefore, cannot be taken away
or restricted without the explicit consent of the shareholders concerned.
These are called rights of individual interest in the corporation (e.g.,
dividend rights, liquidation rights)."
" BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS 221 et. seq. (1946).
"Id. at 228 et seq. See, e.g., MODEL BUSINESS CORPORATION AcT I IOlI (I928).
In Great Britain, notwithstanding the recommendation of the Cohen Report, the aboli-
tion of the ultra vires doctrine has not been achieved. But the fact that the Companies
Act of 1948, 11 & z2 Geo. 6, c. 38, § 5(Y), provides that the objects contained in the
memorandum may be amended without the consent of the court must be noted, as must
the view according to which this doctrine has been virtually abolished in Great Britain.
Holt, Alteration of a Company's Objects and the Ultra Vires Doctrine, 66 L.Q. REV.
493 (1950).
" BALLANTINE, Op1. Cit. supra note 33, at 264 et seq.
30 1 REGELSBERGER, PANDEKTEN 332 et. seq. (1893). The first kind was Gemein-
nutzige Recht, the second, Selbstnutzige Recht. But the first was called Nichtivermogen-
recht or Ver'waltungsrecht or Herrschatsrecht or Mitverwaltungsrecht, and the second
was called Ver'nogensrecht among other scholars. See, e.g., I BONDI, DIE REC-IT DER
AKTIONARE 47 (1930).
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Such a categorical distinction, however, seems to be of quite minor
significance. Even though the voting right must be exercised for the
common interest of the corporation, it does not necessarily mean that
such a right can be taken away in the name of the corporation by ma-
jority decision. On the other hand, even though the dividend right
serves the individual interest of each shareholder, its exercise is condi-
tioned upon the decision through corporation machinery, and it, there-
fore, cannot absolutely be secured like creditors' rights.
According to the atomistic partnership theory, all rights and duties
of the shareholders flow from a common source of equity. There is
no categorical distinction between shareholders' rightsY All rights
ultimately serve the individual interest of each shareholder. The cor-
poration is nothing but the instrumentality for this purpose. But so
long as each shareholder remains as a member of the corporation, his
individual interest shall be achieved within this framework-that is, in
harmony with co-shareholders. This is especially exemplified by the
fact that controlling shareholders may have fiduciary duty both to the
corporation and to the co-shareholders. Thus, in the same way as in
the case of the organic theory, a relative distinction seems to exist be-
tween the field of common interest and that of the freedom of each
shareholder. The distinction, in more realistic terms, seems to be drawn
in a negative way between rights the exercise of which is likely to affect
the common interest of the corporation which, therefore, is threatened
by its abuse, and those whose exercise creates no such fear.3. Minority stockholders' rights, such as rights of derivative suits,
inspection of corporate documents, and various injunctions of illegal
corporate acts, make up a conflicting area between the common interest
of the corporation and the individual interest of each shareholder. Such
rights are primarily invoked to protect minorities, but at the same time,
there is a possibility of intervening in a going concern. Therefore, these
rights must reasonably be restricted from the point of view of the com-
mon interest of the corporation. The existence of such rights makes
insignificant the categorical distinction between rights of common interest
and rights of individual interest.
German corporation law seems to have had a tradition of disliking
such rights and of primarily emphasizing the stockholders' meeting as
the official corporate mechanism. Or, at least a certain amount of stock-
"' Under Anglo-American law, the definition of the share has not been seriously dis-
cussed. Generally speaking, it is nothing but the description of the functioning status
of the share. BALLANTINE, op. cit. supra note 33, at 465 et seq.
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holding was required for the purpose of intervening in corporate affairs. 8
Such a status may be due to the influence of the organic theory, accord-
ing to which "unity" must be pushed to the fore.
By way of contrast, under the partnership theory, it is likely to be
admitted that even the owner of a single share can take such an action
for the defense of his interest against the abuse of administration. It
goes without saying that courts and legislatures in the United States
have been making maximum efforts to prevent the so-called strike suit.
There is inadequate space to enter into details of this matter. Ref-
erence, however, may be made to the California legislation which im-
poses a duty upon the court in connection with a defendant's motion to
require a plaintiff-stockholder to post security for litigation expenses and
to make a preliminary inquiry into the motives and good faith of share-
holder-plaintiff.39
The German Corporation Law of 1937 (Aktiengeseiz) also grants
certain rights to the owner of a single share as a counter-balance to the
shift of authority from the stockholders' meeting to the administration.
But it must be noted that the shareholders' right to ask explanations
from the administration is exercisable only at a stockholders' meeting
and in connection with an agenda prepared by management. However,
if the management does not respond to a request by a minority holding
not iess than one-twentieth of the outstanding stock to convene a stock-
holders' meeting, the court authorizes this minority in its application to
convene a meeting and prescribe the agenda.
The individual shareholder has no remedy like the derivative suit.
Whether a suit should be brought or not is decided either by the stock-
holders' meeting or by the request of a minority holding not less than
one-tenth of the outstanding stock (although in case the matters con-
cerned have already been mentioned in the report of a special auditor,
one-twentieth is enough). In the first case, the suit is brought by a
person appointed by the stockholders' meeting; while in the second
case, the court appoints as a representative the person who was recom-
mended by this minority.
" E.g., according to § ui6 of the German Commercial Code, which is a former
corporation law as far as the German corporation law is concerned, a minority holding
not less than one-tenth of the outstanding capital can require the adjournment of a stock-
holders' meetings or appointment of a special inspector by the court for the purpose of
thorough investigation of balance sheets and other accounting documents.
e CAL. CORP. CODE § 384. (1949). 'See also, BALLANTINE, LATrIN & JENNINGS,
CASES ON CORPORATIONS 563 (zd ed. 1953).
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Such qualifications may be remnants of the organic theory. This is,
however, probably not so. Moreover, such qualifications may be rather
reasonable technical methods of preventing the strike suit. After all, as
described above, the practical consequences tend in a similar direction
with only slight technical differences, whether by the organic theory or
by the atomistic-partnership theory, whether by German law or by
Anglo-American law. The only slight advantage of the atomistic-
partnership theory seems to lie in the fact that all corporate legal rela-
tions can be explained more simply and plainly. In any event, even
though they are different in philosophical terms as well as in political,
social, and economic implications, they keep in view the same autonomous
social reality-i.e., "unity" in "plurality."
Besides these two patterns, some mention must be made of a class
of theories which regards an aggregate of properties designed to specific
purposes (Zweckvermogen) as substratum of the corporation. A well-
known exponent of such a way of thinking was Doctor Brinz."0  This
idea is thought of, on the one hand, as a substitute for the Savignian
fiction theory, and on the other hand, as a generalization of charitable
foundation. Even though Brinz himself did not get substantial support
during his time, there is no doubt that such a way of thinking made a
very important contribution to the discovery of the functional aspect of
the corporate device as a method of insulating separate properties dedi-
cated to the corporate purpose from claims of the creditors of individual
owners (Sondervermogen).
Incidentally, such a conception as that of a "corporation having no
membership as its substratum" is not limited to the field of the private
law. According to Dr. Gierke, such a conception originated in the canon
law and was gradually developed into the institution (Anstalt) theory,
especially with reference to absolutistic bureaucratic monarchies (e.g.,
deutsche Territorialstaate), where governmental mechanisms developed
in such a way that they must necessarily have been conceived of as legal
personalities distinguished from the personal status of kings or lords.41
It is by the same reasoning that the English monarch, as the crown (dis-
tinguished from his or her personal status), has been conceived of as a
corporation sole.42 It might not be wrong to postulate two opposing
conceptual categories of corporations: those having as their substratum
oBRINZ, LEHRBUCH DES PANDEKTEN 979 (.857)-
,2 z GIERKE, DAS DEUTSCHE GENOSSENSCHAFTSRECHT 958 et seg. (1873); 2 GIERKE,
GENOSSENSHAFTSTHEORIE (1887).
4' MAITLAND, SELECtED ESSAYS 73 et seq., xo4 et seq. (1936).
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members and the members' general assembly--the latter being the
supreme and autonomous decision-maker of the corporation (Korper-
schaft) ; and corporations having no such members and no such general
assembly (Anstalt or Stiftang). Along the continuum between these
two conceptualistic extremes exist innumerable mixtures and variations
of the two concepts. 43  In any event, even as a contemporary problem,
due consideration must be given to the second category, with regard to
the increasing importance of the government-owned corporate instru-
mentalities existing in economies that have, to a greater or lesser degree,
undergone the process of nationalization.
III
Now, let us look at the development of the Japanese corporate theory
with reference to its state theory since the modernization instituted by
the Meiji regime (i868). By reason of its unique historical develop-
ment, the modernization of Japan was powerfully pursued by the central
government, which was a constitutional monarchy in a broader sense, but
virtually an absolute hierarchical bureaucracy with the Emperor as its
head. Its constitution took the Prussian constitutional monarchy as its
model, but was of a more absolute nature. All powers, legislative,
administrative, military, and judicial, centered on the Emperor. And,
therefore, as f.r as the political and social structures were concerned,
there remained medieval and feudalistic remnants-or, rather, these
were preserved. On the other hand, under the world situation at that
time, and especially because of the military expansion policy, the indus-
trialization was forcibly pushed by the government's aid. So, instead of
a natural process of capital accumulation-that is, from single firm to
partnership and then to corporation-the corporation was, from the very
beginning, the dominant form of enterprise, and a few family holding
companies reigned over the whole economic field. Thus, the political
power of the Zaibatsu was as great as their economic power. Such a
political-economic-social condition determined, more or less, the develop-
ment of the state and corporate theory in Japan.
As far as the political or state theory was concerned, the Hegelian
theory of the state was dominant. Thus, the Emperor was thought of
According to Gierke there were not a few cases wherein korperschaft and anstalt
elements co-existed and dear-cut demarcation could be drawn only with great difficulty.
Universities were regarded by some states as korperschaft and by others as anstalt. i
GIERKE, DEUTSCHES PRIVATRECHT 4.74. He designated besides korperschaft and anstat,
a third category, staat, because of its unique qualification of sovereignty. Id. at 475.
Its necessity is doubtful, however.
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as an incarnation of an "absolute spirit" (Absolut Geist). The Hegelian
theory was merged with Shintoism, the Japanese state religion, or
Emperor worship.44 Against this, the organic theory of the state,
according to which the Emperor is an organ of the sovereign state, was
the maximum extent of the liberalism under the circumstances of that
time."  And even this theory was suppressed by the ultranational or
totalitarian pressure during the dark age preceding World War II and
continuing until the end of that war. Most of the liberal constitutional
lawyers were Kelsenists in a broader sense, who shut out political points
of view from the field of jurisprudence. As far as the public law was
concerned, therefore, the state theory was not fully developed as one
species of the association theory, because basic rights of citizens against
the state were not fully established.
With regard to corporation law, the Japanese Commercial Code,
one part of which relates to corporation law, was first drafted by Dr.
Herrman Rossler, a German legal advisor to the Department of Justice
in 1844, and finally took definite shape in 1899. Its form and substance
closely resembled the (then) draft German Commercial Code, which
took effect at the beginning of the twentieth century. Subsequent
amendments to the Commercial Code in 1911, 1913, and 1938 in the
field of corporation law tended to reflect German development.4 There-
fore, as far as the corporation theory was concerned, the organic theory
in a broader sense became dominant at an early stage. In any event,
there was no room for the social contract or partnership theory either in
the corporate field or in the state field. The Savignian fiction theory
was likewise not supported.
From the beginning, the main dispute was concerned with the kind
of right the share is-that is, with the definition of the share. According
to the dominant theory, there are two kinds of shareholders' rights, as
in the case of the German corporation theory-the first of which is
conferred on shareholders on behalf of the corporation itself, called
rights of common interest; and the second of which is conferred on
behalf of the shareholders themselves, and therefore, called rights of
individual interest. These two kinds of rights are derived from a com-
"Dr. Kakel, a professor emeritus at the University of Tokyo, was an exponent of
such a standpoint.
' The late Dr. Minobe, a professor emeritus at the University of Tokyo, cannot be
overlooked. His organic state theory marked one epoch in the development of the
constitutional theory in Japan.
" Blakemore & Yazawa, supra note 14.
,7 1 MATSUMOTO, HITo HojIN MONO (1910).
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mon source of membership or membership right (Mitgliedschaftrecht).
This membership right is neither a right in rem nor a creditor's right,
but sui generis, and in the case of business corporations, is a kind of
property right, because it has a capital value. The transfer of the share
means the transfer of the membership right.
Incidentally, the Supreme Court of Japan held at first that the share
is a creditor's right against the corporation, although the court did not
dearly show its reasoning."8 Nearly twenty years later, the Court
adopted the membership-right theory. 9 In any event, by this conclu-
sion, the recognition of the corporation or association law as against the
individual law was established.
With regard to corporate powers from the earlier time, not only
acts which are reasonably related to purposes, but also grants or dona-
tions for charitable purposes have been thought of as being intra vires
under the Germanic influence.50 In the case of nonprofit corporations,
however, the scope of corporate power has been stricdy construed, since
the Civil Code has been thought to adopt the strict ultra vires doctrine,9"
while the Commercial Code does not have any specific provision that is
likely to lead to such a conclusion.
It must be noted that the change of economic structure, especially
after World War I, resulted in a general tendency throughout the
world to differentiate between controlling groups of shareholders and
scattered minority shareholders, and to lower the latter to something
like low-grade debenture-holders. The above-mentioned revisions of the
Japanese corporation law were along this line and were intended to
" "The sale of a share is the sale of the shareholder's right like a creditor's assign-
ment of his claim, and is not a sale of a mere certificate." 7.5 Minroku (Civil Section)
111 (19ox). "A shareholder's right is not a mere creditor's right. But it is something
like a creditor's right in which dividend right and litigation right are included." 13
Minroku (Civil Section) 807 (1905).
"o "A share means the membership right of a shareholder as against a corporation,
and this right exists before the issuance of a certificate." z5 Minroku (Civil Section)
1o88 (i919). "The right of a corporation to require payment from shareholders after
call is originated from its right to require contribution from a shareholder. This right
is a component of the membership relationship between shareholder and corporation."
4 Minshu 277 (1925).
0 MATSUMOTO, EIRIGGISHA NO JIZENJIGYO NI TAISURU KIFu [PHILANTHROPY OF
THE BUSINESS CORPORATION] 135 et seg. (1915).
"The Japanese Civil Code § 343, which was enacted in 1896 and took as its
model the first project of the German Civil Code, provides as follows: "A juristic per-
son has rights and duties, subject to the provisions of laws and ordinances and within
the scope of its objects as determined by the articles of incorporation or by the act of
endowment2'
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increase the flexibility of corporate financing. At the same time, they
facilitated the disclosure of and the court's intervention in corporate
affairs, and the assessment of penalties designed to protect general share-
holders against arbitrary actions of the management.
Against this background about thirty years ago, Dr. Tanaka, 2 pres-
ently the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Japan, presented a
theory that was primarily founded on the organic theory, but that was
deeply influenced by the then-current German theory (Unternehmen an
sich). According to this latter formulation, business corporations are
no longer under the co-ownership of shareholders, but rather their
maintenance and prosperity is the common concern of employees, cus-
tomers, and so on. Therefore, shareholders cannot arbitrarily dissolve
corporations or make other dispositions of their assets.," Dr. Tanaka
construed the above-mentioned first kind of shareholders' rights (e.g.,
the voting right) as not rights against corporations, but as powers that
should be exercised solely on behalf of corporations. Thus, he reasoned
that shareholders should be regarded as an organ of the corporation in
much the same way as are its directors. His ultimate conclusion was
that the terminology of membership right, which is the common source
of rights of shareholders against corporations, must be rejected.
This rationale was followed with little change by Dr. Matsuda 4
according to whose theory such rights are not property rights, but per-
sonal rights that cannot be disposed of by the shareholder. They are,
therefore, exercisable only by the shareholder himself at a stockholders'
meeting, since they are conferred solely for the benefit of the corpora-
tion. This is the reason why the nonvoting shares stand side by side
with the voting shares. Dr. Matsuda then concluded that the essence of
the share is the above-mentioned second kind of right of shareholders
(e.g., the dividend right and liquidation right) and the transfer of shares
means only the transfer of this right. Therefore, shareholders must be
thought of as (internal) creditors. It goes without saying, however,
2z TANAKA, SHOHO-KENKYU [STUDIES ON THE COMMERCIAL LAiV] 2.00 et seq.,
265 et seq. (1935); KATsER-KAISHAHo-GAIRON [ON THE CORPORATION LAW] I1
et seq. (rev. ed. 1939). Dr. Tanaka, a Professor Emeritus at the University of Tokyo,
is one of the most brilliant scholars of Japanese jurisprudence and an exponent of the
Catholic natural law theory. It must not be overlooked that his great work Theory of
World Law, about thirty years ago, had labeled private international law, or conflict of
laws, as virtually international law, not as a part of domestic law.
ra See RATHENAU, VON AKTIENWESEN (1918).
" MATSUDA, KABUSHIKIGAISHA NO KIso-RIRON [THE BASIC THEORY OF THE COR-
PORATION] (1942).
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that their dividend right is not absolutely secured and their liquidation
right is deferred to creditors.
All in all, the main consequences of this theory are to make the
voting trust illegal and to admit the voting proxy as an exception that is
explicitly permitted by the corporation law. In any event, such a con-
struction is consistent with the fact that in modem corporate practice,
the line between creditors and stockholders tends to blur (e.g., the
holder of a subordinated income debenture is not very different from a
holder of nonvoting preferred stock).
But this approach could not completely dominate the field of the
corporate theory in Japan, and, in fact, serious criticism was raised
against such extreme conceptualism. 5 5  It was pointed out that even the
first kind of rights, such as the voting right, is a kind of property right
that can be derived from co-ownership of or equity in the corporation
by shareholders. These rights can be exercised with individual motives,.
therefore, as long as this does not impinge upon the common interest
of the corporation. The illegality of the voting trust and the strict
regulation concerning the proxy device are not drawn from the nature
of the voting right, but rather are imposed by statute as a matter of
public policy. Indeed, under certain circumstances, such devices may
be of benefit to the corporation. The existence of nonvoting shares, too,
can be justified upon the institutional presumption that such share-
holders implicitly waived the voting right. This way of thinking was
deeply influenced by Dr. Karl Wieland of Switzerland, who conse-
quently pursued the atomistic-partnership theory, especially in the field
of private law.5 6 In support of the atomistic-partnership theory it
should be noted that according to the Japanese Commercial Code, a
business partnership can become a corporation by registration in com-
" E.g., Susuki, Kyoeki-ken no Honshitsu [On the True Nature of the Public Rights
in the Corporation] HOGAKU-KYOKAI-ZASHI [6z J. JURISPRUDENCE ASs'N] 300 et seq.
1944).
"WIELAND, HANDELSRECRT [COMMERCIAL LAW] (1921, 1931). According to-
Wieland, partnership (offene Handelsgesellschaft), partnership with limited liability
(Kommanditgesellschaft), and corporations (Aktiengesellschaft, Gesellschaft mnit besch-
rankter Haftung) all are, in fundamental structure, partnerships (Gesellschaftvertrag),
and the distinction exists only between the individualistic partnership (individualistische
Gesellschaft) and the collectivistic partnership (kollectivistische Gesellschaft). His way
of thinking is quite the same as the bracket theory or expansible symbol theory or the
new fictitious theory of corporation. He is much influenced by Maitland. The present
author's work, Shadan-hojinsei no Saikento [On the Corporate Personality], HoGARU-
KYOKAI-ZASHI [70 J. JURISPRUDENCE ASs'N] 248 (1953); 71 id. at 47 (954) (in
Japanese) was much influenced by Professor Wieland.
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pliance with required qualifications; in other words, there exists no bar
between partnerships and corporations.
Now, what is the situation after the end of World War II?57
Following the fragmentation of the Zaibatsu and the incidence of heavy
capital levies in 1947 that forced the sales of shares, the corporate
ownership became more broadly based. While this dispersal did not
occur by a gradual evolutionary process as in the United States, the re-
sulting situation was comparable. It is no wonder, then, that the great
reform of Japanese corporation law, under the guidance of the Mac-
Arthur regime, centered on the shift of power from the stockholders'
meeting to the board of directors and on the strengthening of the rights
of shareholders. Shareholders tended to lose direct contact with the
business, and this was regarded as essential for the attainment of cor-
porate democracy.
In this connection, the holder of even a single share became entitled
to sue for injunction against illegality, fraud, or unfairness on the part
of the management and to institute a derivative suit. In both cases,
however, the shareholder is required to have been such for at least six
months; and in the case of a derivative suit, thirty days must have
expired without any action by the corporation after the shareholder's
demand in writing, except in the case of emergency. Formerly, only
shareholders owning not less than one-tenth of the outstanding shares,
after unsuccessfully demanding a shareholders' meeting for the purpose
of removing directors, might sue to enjoin all such acts by directors.
And instead of a derivative suit, an auditor could bring an action upon
the demand of shareholders owning not less than one-tenth of the out-
standing shares whose request had been refused at a shareholders'
meeting.
The newly-established right to examine the corporate books of
account and records and make extracts therefrom is exercisable only by
shareholders owning not less than one-tenth of the outstanding shares
and meeting certain other requirements. This one-tenth requirement
was inserted by the Legislative Council, a draft-reviewing body whose
members were nominated by the Office of the Attorney General from
among scholars, businessmen, lawyers, and officials. This body refused
to accept the original draft giving such right, without limitation to each
individual shareholder. In any event, the recognition of the rights of
" With regard to the status of the corporate structure after World War It and the
reform of the corporation law under the guidance of the MacArthur regime, see Blake-
more & Yazawa, supra note 14, at i9 et seq.
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a single shareholder has made a channel through which the atomistic-
partnership theory can easily penetrate Japanese corporate theory. In
fact, as already mentioned, these rights make insignificant the categorical
distinction between the rights of common interest and the rights of
individuals.
The atomistic-partnership theory appears recently to have gained
dominance, owing probably to the reorganization of the government
structure. The establishment of the sovereignty of the people has worked
in favor of the social contract theory, and this tendency has automatically
reacted upon the corporate theory. Thus, the recognition of the mem-
bership or equity as the common source of all rights and duties of the
shareholders is more plainly established than it-was under the organic
theory. Incidentally, with regard to corporate powers, purposes of
corporations are no longer thought of in the traditional term of "power,"
but in the more realistic term of "authority" or limitations imposed upon
the directors. And the general tendency is to move further toward the
abolition of constructive notice of the articles of incorporation.5"
At last, there must be noted a most recent theory according to which
business corporations must simply be regarded as business foundations,
and shareholders as contributors and at the same time beneficiaries.
Shareholders' meetings are committees of this foundation.59 Such a
theory is thought of, on the one hand, as a return to Brinz's foundation
theory, and, on the other, as being founded upon the already-mentioned
tendency of general shareholders to become closer and closer to low-
grade debenture or bond holders. Therefore, this theory accords with
the above-mentioned view of shareholders as internal creditors against
corporations. It may not be appropriate, however, to deny the status of
shareholders as members of the corporate body. Such a construction
quite ignores the fact that even though, or rather because, general share-
holders of the mid-twentieth-century big corporations are only nominal
owners, having only "rights without possession," °0 control of the cor-
poration is impossible without the proxy device, a trust, or waiver of
voting power of scattered general shareholders.
In conclusion, the development of corporate theories in Japan
always centers on the question of "What is the substance of the share?"
" UEYANAGI, KAISHA NO NORYIKU [ON THE CAPACITY OF THE CORPORATION] 85
el seq. (1955).
ED3 YAGI, KABUSHIKIGAISHA NO ZAIDANTEKI KOSER [ON THE CORPORATION AS
BUSINESs FOUNDATION] 3 et seq. (1953).
0° BERLE, ECONOMIC POWER AND THE FREE SOCIETY 8 (x957).
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And every time practical consequences need to be drawn or a change in
the social economic tendency is felt, basic legal constructions are at-
tempted. More importantly, the Japanese corporate theory has been
developed without the interaction of the state theory, because the state
theory has not been fully developed as a species of association law.
IV
The principal aim of this article has been to demonstrate that the
development of corporate theories was basically directed by that of state
theories, whether or not each corporate theory was pursued in conscious-
ness of its corresponding state theory. And each state theory is nothing
but the reflection of its corresponding state or government structure.
In Western Europe, the earlier establishment of peoples sovereignty
and democracy produced a simple and plain formula of the partnership
or social-contract theory in the field of corporate theory as well as in
that of state theory. On the other hand, the German Modernization-
i.e., the constitutional monarchies of the Prussian style-produced a
variety of both state and corporate theories. Japan had to follow this
path. The present tendency in Japan toward the partnership doctrine
in corporate theory seems to be based not so much upon scholasticism as
upon the actual political and social environment-4.e., the establishment
of the new constitution and democratic government after World War II.
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